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DEALER LOCATION CLAUSES AND THE PER
SE RULE: FROM SCHWINN TO GTE SYLVANIA
I. Introduction
Restraints affecting trade can be termed either "horizontal" or
"vertical." A horizontal restraint exists if competitors "at the same
level of the market structure" agree to minimize competition.' The
effect of such a restraint is to lessen substantially or eliminate
interbrand competition in a particular area. Thus, consumers are
given no choice between brands when purchasing a particular product. Such limitations are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
A vertical restraint results from an agreement between firms at
"successive stages of the distribution system."' A vertical restraint
may limit intrabrandcompetition, but consumers and distributors
alike might actually benefit from such a restriction4 depending upon
1. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
2. Id. Horizontal territorial limitations are naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except stifling competition. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV, 1974).
It has been held that the Sherman Act:
[Riests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of the country's economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time producing
an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
3. See, e.g., Note, Exceptions to Schwinn's Per Se Rule: Their Validity and Implications
for the Future, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 643, 646 (1974). For example, a vertical restraint may
occur between a manufacturer and a wholesaler, a wholesaler and a retailer, a manufacturer
and a retailer, or they may occur as a result of an agreement among all three levels of a
particular distribution system. Id.
4. Proponents of vertical restraints argue first, that distributors would be unwilling to
handle a manufacturer's product unless they are afforded some protection against "cutthroat" intrabrand competition; second, restraints are necessary to prevent dealers from
invading another dealer's territory and relying on the latter's advertising, while the former
dealer saves promotional costs, and therefore, reaps greater profits; third, such restraints are
designed to motivate dealers to increase their depth of coverage in narrowly defined areas
rather than "skimming" choice customers over a wide area, and fourth, such restraints
insulate a dealer from intrabrand competition, thus providing the dealer with the necessary
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the degree to which competition was limited.'
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the legality of a dealer-location clause," which designated
the location of the dealer's place of business and required the manufacturer's approval as a prerequisite to the dealer opening a second
outlet at a new location, should be judged under the "rule of reason." 7 The purpose of this Note is to examine vertically imposed
dealer-location clauses, to view their effect upon competition and
consumers, and to determine whether such restraints are per se
illegal" under section 1 of the Sherman Act, or whether they require
analysis under the rule of reason."
II.

The Per Se Rule

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 10marked a change in the
attitude of the Supreme Court" towards vertically imposed terrimotivation to provide better service for the manufacturer's product. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1002 n.37 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3299 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (No. 76-15).
5. R. WARREN, ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 129, 136 (1975).
6.

See generally Pollock, Alternative DistributionMethods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L.

REv. 595, 603 (1968).
7. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted,45 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (No. 76-15). The court stated:
We are convinced that a contrary holding would constitute an unwarranted "body
blow" to legitimate business enterprise and would place our free capitalistic system
under stifling restraints, never contemplated or intended by the Congress.
Id.

8. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
[TIhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
For examples of per se illegalities, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972) (horizontal territorial restrictions); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29 (1960) (vertical price fixing); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(group boycotts); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price
fixing).
9. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Restraints analyzed
under the rule of reason require a consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in which
the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects on competition, and the
history of the restraint and the reason for its adoption. Id. at 238.
10. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
11. Four years earlier in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the
Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se rule for vertical territorial and customer restrictions. The Court stated:
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torial and customer 3 restrictions. Schwinn marketed its bicycles
either by direct sale, by consignment, or through an agency relationship to wholesale distributors or to franchised retailers. It instructed
the distributors to sell only to franchised Schwinn accounts and only
in their respective territories. 4 Similarly, Schwinn franchised
retailers only as to designated locations, authorized them to sell only
to consumers and not unfranchised retailers, and required them to
purchase only from or through the distributor authorized to serve
that particular area. 5 The net effect of this system was to prevent
intrabrand competition.
While indicating that "an appraisal of the market impact" of the
Schwinn restraints was appropriate,'" the Court reached for the socalled "ancient rule against restraints on alienation"' 7 and proceeded to establish a per se rule. Conveniently, the Court failed to
note that this common law rule of property law was not of the per
se variety.' 8 It ruled that any attempt to restrain alienation of a
product after parting with title and risk is per se unreasonable and
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, regardless of any busiWe intimate no view one way or the other on the legality of such an arrangement,
for we believe that the applicable rule of law should be designed after a trial.
. . . [Wie know too little of the actual impact of both that [territorial] restriction
and the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion ....
Id. at 261. Moreover, the Court noted: "We do not know enough of the economic and business
stuff out of which these arrangements emerge . . . ." Id. at 263.
12. A vertically imposed territorial restraint exists when a manufacturer transfers his
products with the restriction that they be resold only in a particular territory. See Note,
Restricted Channels of DistributionUnder the Sherman Act, 75 HAv. L. REv. 795 (1962).
13. A customer resale restraint prohibits the resale of the product to a particular class of
customers. Id.
14. 388 U.S. at 371.
15. Id. at 370-71.
16. Id. at 373. The Court stated: "The Government does not contend that a per se
violation of the Sherman Act is presented by the practices which are involved in this appeal
... .Accordingly, we are remitted to an appraisal of the market impact on these practices."
Id.

17. 2 COKE,

INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

§ 360 (Day ed. 1812).

18. See Pollock, supra note 6, at 607. See also Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24
Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711), where the court stated:
To conclude: In all restraints of trade, where nothing more appears, the law presumes
them bad; but if the circumstances are set forth, that presumption is excluded, and
the Court is to judge of those circumstances, and determine accordingly; and if upon
them it appears to be a just and honest contract, it ought to be maintained.
24 Eng. Rep. at 352.
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ness justification. 9
In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that invalidation of franchising
arrangements would force suppliers to abandon franchising and to
integrate forward to the detriment of small business.2 " He found no
justification to accord different treatment to a sale, as opposed to a
consignment or agency relationship.2 ' Justice Stewart concluded
that the use of the ancient rule against restraints on alienation was
not proper because the rule historically proscribed only unreasonable restraints.2 Finally, he argued that contemporary business problems required a "more reasoned and sensitive" approach than the
simple acceptance of the ancient rule.23
Broadly stated, Schwinn stands for the proposition that all postsale vertical restraints are per se illegal. However, two Supreme
Court Justices have stated that Schwinn applied the "rule of reason. '"24 Numerous legal commentators have criticized the soundness
of the decision, 5 and at least one commentator has classified the
19. 388 U.S. at 379-82. Note that the Court declined to extend a per se rule to vertical
restraints in consignment or agency relationships and held that such arrangements were to
be judged under the rule of reason. Id. at 380. See also note 3 supra.
20. Id. at 387 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See generally Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus.
LAW. 669, 687 (1968).
21. 388 U.S. at 389. Justice Stewart stated:
[The courtl does not demonstrate that these restrictions are in their actual operation
somehow more anticompetitive or less justifiable merely because the contractual relations between Schwinn and its jobbers and dealers bear the label "sale" rather than
"agency" or "consignment." Such irrelevant formulae are false guides to sound adjudication in the antitrust field: "Our choice must be made on the basis not of abstractions
but of the realities of modem industrial life."
Id., citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320 (1949) (opinion of Douglas,
J.). See also note 19 supra.
22. Id. at 391. Partial restrictions could be justified when ancillary to a legitimate business
purpose and not unduly anticompetitive in effect.
23. Id. at 392.
24. Justice Douglas has stated, "Under our decisions [including Schwinn] the legality
of exclusive territorial franchises . . . would have to be tried as a factual issue.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger has stated, that in Schwinn, "the Court made it clear that it was
proceeding under the 'rule of reason,' and not by per se rule.
...
United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 617-18 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
25. See generally Keck, supra note 20; Pollock, supra note 6; Williams, Distributionand
the Sherman Act-The Effects of General Motors, Schwinn and Sealy, 1967 DUKE L.J. 732
(1967); Note, Restrictive DistributionArrangements after the Schwinn Case, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 514 (1967); Note, Territorial Restrictionsand the Per Se Rules-A Re-evaluation of the
Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REV. 616 (1972); Comment, The Impact of the
Schwinn Case on Territorial Restrictions, 46 TEXAs L. REV. 497 (1968).
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rule as "dubious." 6 Such a label attaches, because the Government
did not ask for a per se rule27 and because such a rule required the

overruling in part of previous case law. 8 Additionally, the rule could
be used to stifle the resourcefulness of small business and modern
marketing methods. 9 Moreover, through the use of "consignment"
or "agency" methods of distribution, the effect of the rule could be
avoided."
When judging the legality of a restraint unaccompanied by another per se violation, courts must first determine whether the restraint is horizontal or vertical. If horizontal, the inquiry can end
because a finding of a per se illegality is appropriate.3" If vertical, it
is arguable that courts should look to the impact of the restriction
on the marketplace. 2 Thus, for vertical restraints which completely
eliminate competition, such as some territorial and customer restrictions, the courts seem willing to find a per se violation.33 However, for those vertical restraints having a less onerous effect on
competition, the courts often apply the rule of reason. 34 For example, in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. ,3 a vertically imposed
customer restriction on the resale of drugs, allegedly to insure the
maintenance of uniform health and safety standards, was held to be
a per se violation. 3 The court concluded that any possibility of
applying the rule of reason to a sale situation was foreclosed by
Schwinn.3 1 In Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC,3 the Tenth Circuit indicated that it was "compelled" to apply the Schwinn per se rule to
vertically imposed territorial restrictions, but also "believed" that
the Supreme Court should make an exception when a unique prod26. See Keck, supra note 20 at 669.
27. Id. See also note 16 supra.
28. See Keck, note 20 supra, at 669. See also note 11 supra.
29. See Keck, note 20 supra, at 669.
30. Id. The independence of a franchisee could also be eliminated through vertical integration. Such methods of distribution would not fall within the strictures of the Schwinn per
se rule. See note 19 supra.
31. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
32. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
33. See text accompanying notes 35-41 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 42-85 infra.
35. 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973). Contra,
Carter-Wallace Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
36. 302 F. Supp. at 11.
37. Id.
38. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974).
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uct requires such restraints in order to insure its marketability."
Similarly, the Schwinn per se rule has been applied to vertical
prohibitions affecting the resale of trading stamps to a particular
customer, 0 and where the enforcement of vertically imposed territorial and customer restrictions effectively prevented a wholesaler
from purchasing herbicides."
III.
A.

Exceptions to the Per Se Rule

Partial Restraints

Some restraints do not completely eliminate competition. Such
restraints dictate specific policies for the distribution of goods, but
they do not limit the sale of goods to a geographically defined territory or to any particular class of customers. Seemingly, these restraints are susceptible to inclusion within the literal language of
Schwinn. However, they have been upheld against claims that they
fall within the prohibitions of Schwinn's per se rule. Included
among these devices is the dealer-location clause. 3
In GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T. V., Inc.," the appellant
manufacturer, Sylvania, implemented its "elbow room policy" (i.e.,
a "straight line distribution system") under which sales were made
from the factory to franchised dealers, who in turn sold to consumers. " Through franchising, Sylvania hoped to strengthen its market
share position by expanding its dealer base. The elements of this
policy included dealer-location constraints,47 whereby the franchisee
agreed not to sell Sylvania products from a location other than the
39. Id. at 1187. The court of appeals reasoned that factors such as speed of delivery,
quality control of the product, refrigerated delivery, and the condition of the product at the
time of delivery may justify restraints of trade that would be unreasonable when applied to
marketing standardized products. Id.
40. Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 367 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Tex. 1973),
aff'd, 522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1975).
41. Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1055 (1976).
42. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 995 n.25 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (No. 76-15).
43. Note that the decree of the district court on the Schwinn remand upheld the validity
of a location clause. 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
44. 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (No.
76-15).
45. Id. at 983.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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one originally authorized, unless Sylvania approved the new location."
Continental, an authorized Sylvania dealer already franchised to
sell in several locations," sought the manufacturer's approval to sell
Sylvania merchandise from a new location. 50 After Sylvania failed
to approve, 5' Continental proceeded to sell Sylvania goods at the
new location without the manufacturer's approval. 2
Allegedly due to concerns over the dealer's ability to satisfy its
debts,53 Sylvania terminated Continental's franchise. 4 Continental
sought damages, arguing that Sylvania started the credit actions to
enforce the locations restrictions 5 and asserting that Sylvania's
"elbow room policy" was a policy in restraint of trade, constituting
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5"
The district court judge submitted a jury instruction incorporating the theory of per se illegality espoused in Schwinn,5 7 and the jury
48. Id.
49. Id. at 984.
50. Id.
51. Sylvania believed that distribution in the area was already sufficient and that additional Sylvania outlets would be undesirable. Id. at 984-85.
52. Id. at 985.
53. Sylvania had received information of the criminal record of Continental's principal
shareholder and chief operating officer. Additionally, Sylvania learned that Continental had
increased its obligations to Philco, while maintaining a high credit limit with Sylvania.
Further, obligations owed to Sylvania by Continental and held by Maguire for the benefit of
Sylvania were past due. Continental indicated that all obligations would be paid, as soon as,
the dispute over the locations practice was resolved.
As a result of their concern, Sylvania placed a credit hold on Continental's orders and
reduced its credit line from $300,000 to $50,000. Continental reacted by withholding all
payments due. Thereafter, Maguire repossessed Sylvania goods in Continental's possession,
levied attachments on Continental's place of business and bank account, and caused the
closing of some of Continental's stores and warehouses. Similarly, Continental's bank terminated Continental's consumer financing program and called for the payment of a commercial
loan. Id. at 985.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The jury instruction read:
Therefore, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Sylvania entered into a
contract, combination or conspiracy with one or more of its dealers pursuant to which
Sylvania exercised dominion and control over the products sold to the dealer, after
having parted with title and risk to the products, you must find any effort thereafter
to restrict outlets or store locations from which its dealers resold the merchandise
which they had purchased from Sylvania to be a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, regardless of the reasonableness of the location restrictions.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

returned a verdict in favor of Continental. 5 Also, the court found
that Sylvania's credit concerns were not the true reasons for its
actions" and entered a limited injunction prohibiting Sylvania from
enforcing its locations clause. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the district court judge committed error in submitting a per se
instruction and that the legality of the locations clause should be
judged under the rule of reason."
The majority reasoned that Schwinn had been applied too literally and without reference to its facts. 2 For example, Schwinn's
territorial and customer restrictions absolutely prevented dealers
from selling to customers outside of their designated territory. 3
However, Sylvania's dealers could advertise and sell to customers
from any area, and "were limited only as to the location of the
franchisee's place of business." 4 The effect of the Schwinn restrictions was to destroy intrabrand competition, because a potential
purchaser could buy only from the authorized dealer for his territory. 5 In contrast, Sylvania franchised at least two dealers in major
markets, thus preserving intrabrand competition by giving the potential purchaser a choice between competing dealers.
While conceding that the locations practice did "check" intraId. at 987.
The dissent argued that the district judge did not submit a per se instruction, but instead
presented the jury with the issue of whether Sylvania had entered into a post-sale contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Id.at 1006 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
58. The jury assessed damages in the amount of $591,505. Id.at 985-86.
59. Id.at 986.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 988.
62. The court expressed the view that:
[Ejach case arising under the Sherman Act must be determined upon the particular
facts disclosed by the record, and . . . the opinions in those cases must be read in the
light of their facts and of a clear recognition of the essential differences in the facts of
those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule of earlier decisions is to
be applied.
Id.at 989 (citations omitted).
63. Id.at 989-90.
64. Id. at 990. The court stated:
Thus a critical and very obvious distinction . . . is that Schwinn involved a restriction
on the locations and types of permissible vendees, while Sylvania only imposed restrictions on the permissible locations of vendors.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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brand competition to a certain extent,"7 the court of appeals concluded that "rather than unreasonably restricting competitive
market forces, [the practice] actually had a procompetitive effect." It enabled Sylvania, a marginal producer, to achieve the
status of a viable competitor" in an oligopolistic industry." The
court stated:"
Whether some diminution in intrabrand competition is justified when it
averts the loss of one competitor in an industry that is already oligopolistic
should ultimately be a question for the finder of the facts. Our choice of a
rule of reason test over a per se rule of illegality means only that the critical
policy question will at least be asked and answered.

As further justification for a rule of reason test the court looked
to decisions involving exclusive dealerships." In Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.," the Ninth Circuit
concluded that it was not a per se violation for a manufacturer to
give a distributor an exclusive franchise, even if it meant "cutting
off another distributor." 4 Accordingly, the Sylvania majority
argued that if exclusive dealerships are legal, it must also be legal
to enforce the promise of exclusivity by withholding from maverick
dealers, such as Continental, the power to sell from an unauthorized
location within the first dealer's exclusive territory." ' In contrast,
67.

Id. at 1000.

68. Id. at 1001.
69. Sylvania's share of the market in 1962 was 2 percent and by 1965 it was 5 percent. Id.
at 1002.
70. Id. at 1001-02. An oligopoly exists when a small number of producers sell only a
standardized product. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 49
(D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
71. 537 F.2d at 1002. The court noted that any reduction of intrabrand competition
resulting from the locations practice did not lead to the evils generally associated with an
unreasonable restraint of trade because the television industry experienced both an increase
in volume and a decrease in price during the critical time period. Id.
72. An exclusive dealership exists when a manufacturer promises not to employ another
dealer or to sell to anyone else within a designated geographic area. Id. at 997.
73. 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
74. 416 F.2d at 76. See also Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093 (3d
Cir. 1972); Anaya v. Las Cruces Sun News, 455 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1972).
75. 537 F.2d at 997. Assuming the application of a per se rule to exclusive dealerships,
once a dealer is "franchised anywhere he is franchised everywhere. " Id. at 998.
The adoption of a per se rule might diminish the capacity of the small, independent
franchisee to compete with the large vertically integrated giants. For example, if a single
franchisee expanded and sold everywhere in violation of a contract provision, it would be
impossible for other single outlet franchises of the same manufacturer to compete effectively.
Id. at 999.
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the dissent saw a distinction between a manufacturer's restricting
his own behavior through the use of exclusive dealerships and restricting an independent franchisee through the use of a locations
clause." Concededly, a distinction between the two practices exists,
but in order to insure that an exclusive dealership has its intended
effect, a manufacturer must have the power to deny other dealers
the right to sell within an existing exclusive territory.
The Ninth Circuit also argued that locations clauses had never
been struck down for illegality." For example, prior to Schwinn, in
Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp.," a clause which fixed the
location for the sale of used cars by a dealer "at such a place as
would not unduly prejudice other dealers" was held a reasonable
restraint of trade." Moreover, after Schwinn, in Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,S° the Tenth Circuit held that a location clause
was valid as a matter of law.' Similarly, the Third Circuit affirmed
a summary judgment in favor of an auto manufacturer against an
allegation of an illegal location clause. 2
Vertical restraints, such as "area of primary responsibility""3 and
"profit pass over""4 clauses, are far more burdensome than location
clauses." Nevertheless, these restraints have been upheld under the
rule of reason. Thus, lower courts have demonstrated a willingness
76. Id. at 1013-14 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 992.
78. 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
79. 124 F.2d at 823.
80. 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 576.
82. Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'g without opinion 396
F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
83. An "area of primary responsibility" is created when a dealer is responsible for a "best
effort" within prescribed boundaries and the manufacturer may discontinue the franchise if
the "area of primary responsibility" is not covered adequately. See Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 327 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1971). However, such an arrangement is not permitted if it is in substance a restraint upon alienation. See Hobart Brothers
Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973)
(silent understanding translated a "primary responsibility" clause into a per se illegal restriction).
84. A "profit pass over" clause requires a dealer to turn over part of the profit made on a
sale outside his "area of primary responsibility" to the dealer designated for that area. See
Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See also
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (No. 76-15).
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to abandon the Schwinn per se rule for these less than complete
restraints on alienation. These courts have also evidenced a desire
to look to the effect of such restraints on competition.
B.

Outright Restraints on Alienation

By utilizing the specific language of Schwinn, some courts have
circumvented its broad proscriptions, even for the more onerous
restraints of trade.
1. The requirement of "firm and resolute" enforcement
The Schwinn Court found that the manufacturer enforced its
territorial and customer restrictions with threats that the franchise
would be terminated. 7 As a result, some courts" have interpreted
Schwinn to mean that enforcement of the restraints by the manufacturer is necessary to a finding of a per se illegality. Such decisions
are both logical and consistent with the purposes of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 9
In Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc. ,9 the Second Circuit
held that a customer restriction 9 was not a per se violation since
there was conflicting evidence as to whether the manufacturer had
been "firm and resolute" in insisting on compliance with the restric86. It is interesting to note that the first cases to use this reasoning involved absolute
customer restraints, as in Schwinn. See notes 89-90, 97 infra and accompanying text. However, subsequent application of the rationale of these decisions has encompassed many of the
less burdensome restraints of trade. See notes 92, 101-102 infra and accompanying text.
87. The Court stated:
It is clear and entirely consistent with the District Court's findings that Schwinn has
been "firm and resolute" in insisting upon observance of territorial and customer
limitations by its bicyle distributors and upon confining sales by franchised retailers
to consumers, and that Schwinn's "firmness" in these reports was grounded upon the
communicated danger of termination.
388 U.S. at 372.
88. See, e.g., Good Investments Promotions, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891
(6th Cir. 1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th. Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), modified, 401 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976) (manufacturer had
"firmly and resolutely" enforced its territorial restrictions).
89. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
90. 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968).
91. The pertinent clause provided: "'Retailer' will not, where statute or law permits such
restriction, sell any of the 'Commodities' except to consumers for use." 396 F.2d at 400.
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tion.92 Similarly, in Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc.,93
a manufacturer authorized a distributor to sell within a defined
area. In concluding that there was no per se violation, the Tenth
Circuit pointed out that there was no "firm and resolute" insistence
upon the observance of the restriction.94
2. Dangerous products- "without more"
The Schwinn court stated: 5
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer
to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.

In Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.,'" a manufacturer prohibited the
resale of beauty and barber supplies to nonprofessional users. The
Third Circuit reached for the "without more" language of Schwinn,
found that "there [was] more"97 due to the potential danger of the
product to uneducated consumers,9" and held that the restriction
was to be treated under the rule of reason.99 In a similar case, the
Court of Claims citing Tripoli held that the rule of reason must be
applied to vertical restraints on the resale of drugs.' 5 At least one
state court has extended this concept and judged vertical restraints,
used to maintain quality control, under the rule of reason. '
C.

New or Failing Company Defense

Schwinn itself made specific reference to two exceptions to the per
se rule (i.e., the new or failing company exceptions).' 2 Although not
92.
93.

Id. at 406.
472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973).

94. Id. at 639. The court went on to hold that the territorial provision was nothing more
than a "description of a primary marketing territory" and therefore, was not a per se violation. Id.
95. 388 U.S. at 379.
96. 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
97. 425 F.2d at 936.

98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Contra,
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
410 U.S. 52 (1973).
101. La Fortune v. Ebie, 26 Cal. App. 3d 72, 102 Cal. Rptr. 588 (2d Dist. 1972).
102. Generally, the failing company defense has been applied to mergers or acquisitions
which would otherwise violate section 7 of the Clayton Act. See 537 F.2d at 1004 n.41. It is
basically a "lesser of two evils" approach, in which the possible anticompetitive effects of the
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applicable to the Schwinn facts, proof that a company is new or
failing is relevant to a showing that a vertical restraint is not anticompetitive and is accordingly sheltered by the rule of reason.'0
In Sylvania, the manufacturer sought a failing company instruction, arguing that it would be forced to abandon its business if it
were not allowed to increase its share of the market through the
imposition of the dealer-location clauses.0 4 The court noted the existence of the failing company defense,' 5 but concluded there was
no need for a jury instruction incorporating the defense, because a
new trial had been ordered under the rule of reason.'10 By looking
to the procompetitive effect of the location clause,0 7 however, the
majority silently adopted the reasoning of the failing company exception.' 08 Thus, even though Sylvania's actions led to a restraint
of trade, the court permitted them in order to avoid the loss of a
competitor. Therefore, the court preserved competition in the industry.' 9
IV.

Interpreting the Per Se Rule

Controversy abounds as to the application of the per se rule.
While some jurists attempt to avoid the effects of such a rule," 0
others strictly construe Schwinn to mean that all post-sale vertical
merger are deemed preferable to the potential adverse impact on competition, if the company
failed. United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974). The Clayton Act test
for a failing company is, first, that its resources be "so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure," International' Shoe
Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930), and second, that there was no other prospective
purchaser for it. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). Thus, a
merger between a financially stable corporation and a failing one which is no longer a competitive factor can be upheld under the Clayton Act. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
103. 388 U.S. at 374.
104. 537 F.2d at 1017 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1004 n.41.
106. Id.
107. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 103 supra.
109. It should be noted that this argument parallels similar concerns expressed under
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Thus, the primary goal of the Clayton Act is the preservation
of competition and not necessarily competitors. Accordingly, although a merger leads to one
less competitor, it would be prevented only if it tended to lessen competition. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). Note however, in cases like Sylvania the
continued existence of the competitor necessarily insures the preservation of competition due
to the oligopolistic nature of the industry.
110. See text accompanying notes 42-109 supra.
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restraints are prohibited."' Judge Kilkenny, in his Sylvania dissent,
argued that United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.," 2 a case involving horizontal restraints, "strengthened and extended the
Schwinn per se rule against territorial restrictions.""' He took issue
with the procompetitive policy argument"' of the Sylvania majority
and stated:" '
. . . [T]opco stands for the rule that restricted intrabrand competition
cannot be justified by alleged interbrand competitive gain . . . [and that]

the preservation and encouragement of intrabrand competition, [is] a desirable end in itself.

Topco was an association of supermarkets engaged in procuring
and distributing food items under brand names owned by Topco, in
order to compete more effectively with larger national and regional
chains."' Each member agreed with Topco to the designation of a
territory in which that member could sell Topco brand products." 7
Although striking down the territorial restrictions, the Court emphasized that a per se violation existed because the restraint was
essentially horizontal and not vertical." 8 Horizontal restraints have
traditionally been per se violations"' and thus the case is easily
distinguished from both Schwinn and Sylvania.
In his Sylvania dissent, Judge Kilkenny also stated that Cooper
Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.,2 0 ". . . reaffirms the Schwinn
dogma that the Supreme Court has 'set its face against both horizontal and vertical territorial restrictions' ..
".."I" However, the
Fifth Circuit found that Coors' system of exclusive regional distributorships had the effect of maintaining control over the wholesale and
retail prices of its beer.' Price fixing is another traditional per se
violation. 3 Therefore, any restraint accompanied by price fixing is
111.
112.

See text accompanying notes 113-123 infra.
405 U.S. 596 (1972).

113.

537 F.2d at 1012 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

114.
115.

See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
537 F.2d at 1015 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).

116.

405 U.S. at 599.

117. Id.at 602.
118. Id. at 608.
119. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
120. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. 537 F.2d at 1013 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
122. 506 F.2d at 944.
123. See note 8 supra. See also Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), modified, 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Apr. 20,

1976) (No. 76-41).
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illegal regardless of its reasonableness. Accordingly, Coors is factually and legally distinguishable from both Schwinn and Sylvania.
V.

Conclusion

The creation and application of an absolute per se rule with regard to all post-sale vertical restraints is not justified. Instead, restraints affecting trade require the weighing of the procompetitive
and anticompetitive effects of the restraint, in order to determine
what result is best for a particular industry and for society as a
whole.
Enlightened decisions"4 dealing with less offensive restraints of
trade, and decisions'25 which look to the specific language of
Schwinn to reach a contrary result are part of a trend to abandon
the per se rule for a more result-oriented approach. These cases
indicate an awareness of the "economic and business stuff"'25 which
governs the business world. Such an analysis benefits the business
giants, the single proprietorships, and ultimately the consumers." 7
Thus, the Supreme Court should reexamine the Schwinn per se rule
and end its broad proscriptions.
Michael W. Miller
124. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (No. 76-15).
125. See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1970); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 938 (1968).
126. See note 11 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 62-71, 110 supra.

